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BARGAINING OVER THE INTRODUCTION OF
ROBOTS INTO THE WORKPLACE
Pursuant to Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act,
an employer must bargain with the exclusively recognized repre-
sentative of its employees about "wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment." Whether this language includes
an employer's decision to replace its workforce through automa-
tion has not yet been resolved. This Comment argues that because
of the profound impact a decision to automate is likely to have
upon "terms and conditions of employment," an employer should
be required to bargain collectively with the union representing the
affected employees prior to implementation of the decision. Only
in this way can the rights of workers facing technological displace-
ment be ensured.
INTRODUCTION
The long-term impact of industrial robots on the future factory
will be great.1 Currently, robots are used mainly for dangerous and
tedious jobs;2 however, they may eventually replace many human
workers.
Opinions vary widely on just how many factory jobs could be elim-
inated by robots. Some automation experts have estimated that ro-
bots will reduce today's factory workforce 65 to 75 percent by the
year 2000.3 Although labor unions have been keeping a close watch
on this development, robots are not viewed as an immediate threat to
workers because they must constantly be maintained and fed parts
with which to work. However, a virtually unmanned factory is possi-
ble. The Italian automobile company, Fiat, believes that sensory ro-
1. When Robots Take Over People's Jobs, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Feb. 16,
1981, at 75-76.
2. Id. at 75.
3. Gilcrest & Shenkin, The Impact of Computers on Employment, THE Fu-
TURIST, Feb. 1981, at 49.
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bots will slash manpower requirements at that plant by 90% over the
next ten years.
Robots are necessary to complete the automation of U.S. industry.
They increase productivity and reduce costs.5 Additionally, robots
will be able to perform dangerous and tedious jobs and may thereby
result in the eventual upgrading of tasks performed by laborers.'
Conversely, employment tenure in many industries is threatened by
the introduction of robots.7 Besides layoffs, automation and robot in-
troduction may lead to the downward reclassification of workers and
loss in pay.8 Finally, the increased use of robots in industry threatens
the survival of unions as organized entities.9 Therefore, it is not sur-
prising that unions wish to be included in the bargaining process
with respect to management decisions to install robots.10
This Comment considers whether, and under what conditions, an
employer must bargain with the union representing its workers about
4. Cornish, The Smart Machines of Tomorrow: Implications for Society, THE
FUTURIST, Aug. 1981, at 13. According to the Congressional Office of Technology As-
sessment, there are approximately 7,000 industrial robots presently at work in the United
States. By the end of the decade, this number is expected to increase to between 50,000
and 100,000 robots. The Robots are Already Here, CAL. LAW., Jan. 1984, at 31.
Adam Osborne writes,
Given the tasks that robots will be able to perform, the impact on the blue-collar
force will be profound. Most assembly line jobs will be eliminated. Automobiles,
washing machines, and television sets will all be assembled by robots. Robots
will even assemble themselves.
A. OSBORNE, RUNNING WILD: THE NEXT INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 62 (1979).
5. Some robots cost as little as $6.00 per hour to operate, compared to the $20.00
in pay and benefits for the average auto worker. The Robots are Already Here, CAL.
LAW., Jan. 1984, at 31.
6. In Japan, where over 10,000 industrial robots are currently in use, robots are
used in "dangerous, unhealthy and repetitive jobs." Displaced employees have moved to
jobs which are more intellectually challenging and less physically demanding. Japanese
companies, unlike American companies, have assumed the responsibility of retraining
workers displaced by robots. As a result, "[e]mployees consider production by robots as a
means of relieving monotonous and environmentally harmful tasks." OFFICE OF TECH-
NOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, EXPLORATORY WORKSHOP ON
THE SOCIAL IMPACTS OF ROBOTICS 34-35 (1981) [hereinafter cited as EXPLORATORY
WORKSHOP].
7. See, e.g., D. BOK, AUTOMATION, PRODUCTIVITY AND MANPOWER PROBLEMS 9
(1964) (Where the increase in worker productivity is so great that it outstrips consumer
demand, employment levels fall off.) But see EXPLORATORY WORKSHOP, supra note 6, at
35 (If robots can cause increased economic growth (as automation generally does), more
jobs will be created than lost.)
.[T]he relatively high tempo of real economic growth in Japan, with its con-
sequent demand for increased labor, has more than compensated for the losses
of jobs resulting from increasing productivity, automation, and robot
introduction.
Id.
8. See generally Gilerest & Shenkin, supra note 3, at 49-50.
9. See Taylor, Collective Bargaining, in AUTOMATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE 80, 85-86 (J. Dunlop ed. 1962).
10. See generally Hanauer, Bargaining for Jobs in the Automated Factory, CAL.
LAW., Jan. 1984, at 28-31.
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a decision to introduce robots. Because this issue has not yet been
addressed by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) or the
courts, labor and management must rely for precedent on cases con-
cerned with automation."1 Automation cases have been infrequent
and inconsistent.1 2 Accordingly, this Comment will address the ma-
jor rulings dealing with bargaining over subcontracting and partial
plant closure13 as the courts generally have found these cases to be
persuasive in the automation area. 4
Reference will be made throughout this Comment to "decision"
and "impact" bargaining. Decision bargaining generally refers to
bargaining before a decision has been reached by the employer. Im-
pact bargaining, also called effects bargaining, refers to bargaining
about the rights of affected employees after the employer has imple-
mented its decision. There is no dispute that an employer must bar-
gain with the union about the effects of management decisions which
result in the termination of bargaining unit employees. 5 Rather, the
controversy has centered around the issue of whether or not the
union should also be given the opportunity to bargain over the deci-
sion itself.
THE LAW DETERMINING AN EMPLOYER'S DUTY TO BARGAIN OVER
MANAGERIAL DECISIONS
Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
makes an employer's refusal to bargain collectively with the exclu-
sively recognized representative of its employees an unfair labor
practice.16 Section 8(d), added by the 1947 Taft-Hartley amend-
ments, sets out the mandatory subjects of bargaining: "wages, hours,
11. Id. at 28.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 66-88.
13. This Comment will not address cases dealing with management decisions to
close an entire operation. It is well established that an employer has a right to unilater-
ally terminate its business, although it may be required to bargain about the impact the
decision will have on workers. See Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380
U.S. 263 (1965).
14. McNeill & Libby v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 48 Wis. 2d
272, 179 N.W.2d 805 (1970).
15. This Comment's focus is an employer's duty to bargain about its decision to
eliminate unit work before actually doing so as opposed to its duty to bargain over the
impact of its accomplished decision on the workforce. Where the decision will have a
measurabfe impact on workers in the bargaining unit, the employer usually will be re-
quired to bargain over the effects of its decision. Gacek, The Employer's Duty to Bar-
gain on Termination of Unit Work, 32 LAB. L.J. 659, 660 (1981).
16. 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(5) (1976).
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and other terms and conditions of employment . . . . 17 This lan-
guage must be interpreted in order to determine whether certain
management decisions are mandatory subjects of bargaining. 18
Decision Bargaining over Termination of Unit Work:
Subcontracting and Partial Plant Closure
Whether the NLRA requires an employer to bargain over man-
agement decisions which eliminate jobs in a bargaining unit depends
upon various factors. When the employer's decision is motivated by
anti-union animus, the employer will be required to bargain.19 There
is no consensus, however, over whether an employer must also bar-
gain about decisions which are economically motivated.20
The leading case determining whether "terms and conditions of
employment" include employer decisions that terminate unit work is
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB.21 The Fibreboard Com-
pany employed a staff of custodial workers under a union contract.
After conducting an extensive investigation, the company decided
that its maintenance costs could be reduced if the custodial work
were contracted out. When the union contract was about to expire,
the employer informed the union of its intention to subcontract the
work to an independent contractor, but refused to bargain over its
decision. After the contract expired, the maintenance work was con-
tracted out and the custodial employees terminated. Unfair labor
practice charges were filed by the union.22
The trial examiner and the Board originally found no violations.23
The Board reversed its position on rehearing, holding the employer
was obligated to bargain about its decision to subcontract, even
though the decision was economically motivated. 24 The Board or-
dered Fibreboard to reinstate the custodial workers with back pay,
and to bargain in good faith about its decision before subcontract-
ing.25 The Supreme Court upheld enforcement of the Board's order,
holding that Fibreboard's decision did affect "terms and conditions
of employment" and that the employer had violated section 8(a)(5)
17. 29 U.S.C. §158(d) (1976). The mandatory subjects are those about which an
employer is required to bargain in good faith, as opposed to permissive subjects, which
are those about which he may bargain. R. GORMAN, BAsIc TEXT ON LABOR LAW:
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 496-98 (1977).
18. Platt, The Duty to Bargain as Applied to Management Decisions, 19 LAB. L.J.
143, 145 (1968).
19. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
20. Gacek, supra note 15, at 660.
21. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
22. The union filed charges of violation of §§8(a)(1), (3) and (5) of the NLRA, 29
U.S.C. §§158(a)(1), 158(a)(3) and 158(a)(5) (1976). 379 U.S. at 207.
23. 130 N.L.R.B. 1558, 47 L.R.R.M. 1547 (1961).
24. 138 N.L.R.B. 550, 51 L.R.R.M. 1101 (1962).
25. Id. at 554, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1102.
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by refusing to bargain over a mandatory subject of bargaining.26
In reaching its decision, the Court noted that the employer sought
to replace one group of employees with another doing the same kind
of work within the same plant.2 The employer's basic operation had
not changed, and an order to bargain would not therefore greatly
interfere with the employer's freedom to manage his business.,, The
majority was careful to limit the opinion to subcontracting which
resulted in the "replacement of employees in the existing bargaining
unit with those of an independent contractor to do the same work
under similar conditions of employment ... .
Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, stated that sub-
contracting was well within the literal meaning of "terms and condi-
tions of employment" but that cases involving termination of unit
work would have to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.3 0 The courts
should look to whether (1) the employer still intended to have the
work performed, (2) the decision changed the basic nature of the
business, (3) the decision involved a major alteration in capital struc-
ture, and (4) industrial practice dictated that the decision would be
suitable for resolution within a collective bargaining framework.3 1
In a concurring opinion written by Justice Stewart, three justices
sought to limit the Court's holding.32 Justice Stewart cautioned
against an expansive reading of the majority opinion to include all
managerial decisions which have an impact on job security as
mandatory subjects of bargaining. 3 He argued that the employer
should be free to implement decisions unilaterally if they "are funda-
mental to the basic direction of a corporate enterprise or which im-
pinge only indirectly upon employment security . . .,.
The Response to Fibreboard
A year after Fibreboard, the Board held in Westinghouse Electric
Corp.3 5 that subcontracting of unit work does not create a duty to
bargain unless it will have a "demonstrable adverse impact on em-
26. 379 U.S. at 209.
27. Id. at 213.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 215.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 213.
32. Justice Stewart was joined in the dissent by Justices Douglas and Harlan. Id.
at 217-26.
33. Id. at 218.
34. Id. at 223.
35. 150 N.L.R.B. 1574, 58 L.R.R.M. 1257.
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ployees in the unit.""6 Under this test, decisions having no such im-
pact are not considered sufficiently related to "terms and conditions
of employment" to require bargaining.
During the years following Westinghouse, the Board sought to
clarify "demonstrable adverse impact." It indicated that subcon-
tracting is a mandatory subject of bargaining when some employees
are to be laid off,3 7 transferred to lower paying jobs,38 or will lose a
substantial amount of overtime.39 Further, the adverse impact on the
bargaining unit had to be provable rather than speculative.40 Not-
withstanding the preceding factors, the NLRB holds in most cases
that subcontracting is a mandatory subject of bargaining under sec-
tion 8(d) of the Act.4
In addition to subcontracting, the Board extended Fibreboard to
partial closure cases - when the employer closes one of its plants
but remains in business at other locations. For example, in Ozark
Trailers, Inc.,42 the Board adopted an expansive reading of
Fibreboard, holding that all decisions which result in the termination
of unit work should be mandatory subjects of bargaining. 43
In Ozark Trailers, the employer had shut down one of its three
manufacturing plants without first bargaining with the union. The
NLRB stated that the right of employees to bargain about the labor
they had invested in the business enterprise would always be treated
on par with the employer's prerogative to make a change in his busi-
ness. 44 The Board also suggested that the imposition of the duty to
decision bargain would not place an intolerable burden on manage-
ment because the employer is only required to make a good faith
effort to reach an acceptable solution. "If such efforts fail, the em-
ployer is wholly free to make and effectuate his decision. 45 For six-
teen years after Ozark Trailers, the NLRB generally required em-
ployers to bargain about decisions to partially terminate operations.48
During this time, a split of authority existed among the courts of
appeals on the issue of mandatory bargaining over economically mo-
tivated subcontracting and partial closure decisions. The Eighth Cir-
cuit took a very restrictive view of Fibreboard in NLRB v. Adams
36. Id. at 1577, 58 L.R.R.M. at 1259.
37. NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, 147 N.L.R.B. 788, 56 L.R.R.M. 1266 (1964),
afjd In part, 361 F.2d 512, 62 L.R.R.M. (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 935 (1966).
38. Amear Div., 231 N.L.R.B. 83, 96 L.R.R.M. 1291 (1977), enforced, 592 F.2d
422, 100 L.R.R.M. 2710 (8th Cir. 1979).
39. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1204, 62 L.R.R.M. 1175 (1966).
40. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 443, 59 L.R.R.M. 1355 (1965).
41. See R. GORMAN, supra note 17, at 514.
42. 161 N.L.R.B. 561, 63 L.R.R.M. 1264 (1966).
43. Id. at 570, 63 L.R.R.M. at 1269.
44. Id. at 566, 63 L.R.R.M. at 1267.
45. Id. at 568, 63 L.R.R.M. at 1268.
46. See R. GORMAN, supra note 17, at 517.
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Dairy, Inc.47 There the court held that the employer's decision to sell
its delivery trucks and contract out its delivery work was not a
mandatory subject of bargaining because (1) the company's decision
involved a major change in capital structure and (2) the change was
not motivated by anti-union animus."" The court reasoned that since
the employer's decision involved substantial capital expenditure, it
was distinguishable from Fibreboard. The court relied on the con-
curring opinion in Fibreboard, stressing that the duty to bargain
does not arise in situations involving significant capital investment or
changes in capital structure.49
The Ninth Circuit has also followed the language of Justice Stew-
art's concurring opinion and has agreed that absent anti-union ani-
mus, there is no duty to bargain over management decisions.50 In
direct conflict, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have expanded
Fibreboard.5 Unlike the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, they have not
been swayed by the amount of capital expenditure involved, nor have
they considered the presence of anti-union animus in section 8(a)(5)
cases. Instead, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have read Fibreboard to
require bargaining over all management decisions which eliminate
bargaining unit work.
Finally, the Third Circuit has developed a balancing test ap-
proach. In Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB,52 the court held there
47. 350 F.2d 108, 60 L.R.R.M. 2084 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011,
61 L.R.R.M. 2192 (1966).
48. 350 F.2d at 111-12, 60 L.R.R.M. at 2034. The second requirement, anti-union
animus, comes from the Supreme Court decision in Textile Workers Union v. Darlington
Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965), which held that partial plant closure to chill unionism
violated section 8(a)(3) of the Act. In Adams Dairy, the Court failed to distinguish the
Fibreboard duty to bargain under section 8(a)(5) from the rule in Darlington prohibiting
discrimination against employees for their union beliefs. Apparently, the Court mixed the
elements of section 8(a)(5) and section 8(a)(3) violations and concluded that where a
significant change in capitalization has occurred, there is no duty to bargain in the ab-
sence of anti-union animus. 350 F.2d 108, 113, 60 L.R.R.M. 2034, 2088. See also R.
GORMAN, supra note 17, at 514.
49. 350 F.2d 108, 60 L.R.R.M. 2084.
50. See, e.g., NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933, 65
L.R.R.M. 2861 (9th Cir. 1967).
51. See, e.g., NLRB v. American Mfg. Co. of Texas, 351 F.2d 74, 60 L.R.R.M.
2122 (5th Cir. 1965). On facts very similar to those in Adams Dairy, the court con-
cluded the employer was obligated to bargain over its decision to sell its delivery trucks
and contract out its delivery work. Also, the court stated the duty to bargain existed
apart from anti-union animus. See NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, 361 F.2d 512, 62
L.R.R.M. 2218 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 935 (1966). See also Weltronic Co. v.
NLRB, 419 F.2d 1120, 73 L.R.R.M. 2014 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 939
(1970).
52. 582 F.2d 720, 99 L.R.R.M. 2013 (3d Cir. 1978).
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is no per se rule that an employer's decision to close part of its oper-
ations is or is not a mandatory subject of bargaining.53 Instead, the
matter should be resolved by a balancing of interests with a pre-
sumption that an economically motivated partial business shutdown
creates a duty to bargain unless the employer has suffered severe
economic loss.
54
The latest Supreme Court decision to address bargaining over
management decisions is First National Maintenance Corp. v.
NLRB.55 There, the Supreme Court held that an employer may uni-
laterally shut down part of a business for purely economic reasons
without first consulting the union.5" Only the "effects" of such a de-
cision are subjects for mandatory bargaining.
57
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, identified three types
of management decisions.58 First, there are decisions which are al-
most exclusively an aspect of the relationship between the employer
and employee.59 Bargaining in these situations is mandatory. Second,
there are decisions which have only an indirect impact on employees,
over which decision bargaining is not required. 60 And finally, there
are those which involve a change in the scope and direction of the
business enterprise, but which also have a direct impact on
employment."'
The majority suggested a balancing test be used with regard to the
third type of decision, and that bargaining should be required only
when the "benefit, for labor-management relations and the collec-
tive-bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct
of the business."6 2
Whether First National Maintenance will have any effect on deci-
sion bargaining in situations other than partial closure cases is ques-
tionable. Although Justice Blackmun discussed broadly the duty to
53. Id. at 731, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2023.
54. Id.
55. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
56. Id. at 686.
57. "There is no dispute that the union must be given a significant opportunity to
bargain about these matters of job security as part of the 'effects' bargaining mandated
by §8(a)(5)." Id. at 681.
58. Id. at 676-77.
59. These include layoffs, recalls, production quotas and work rules. Id. at 677.
60. These include decisions about advertising and product type and design (i.e.,
decisions which are not primarily about the relationship between the employer and em-
ployee). Id. at 677.
61. These include subcontracting and partial plant closure decisions. Id.
62. Id. at 679.
[I]n view of an employer's need for unencumbered decisionmaking, bargaining
over management decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued
availability of employment should be required only if the benefit, for labor-man-
agement relations and the collective-bargaining process, outweighs the burden
placed on the conduct of the business.
Id.
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decision bargain over various types of management decisions, he
added in a footnote that the majority was not suggesting any view as
to "other types of management decisions."6 3 These would have to be
considered on a case-by-case basis. Further, the NLRB General
Counsel, after First National Maintenance, issued a memorandum
to the Board's regional directors stating "[t]he court expressly left
open the issue of whether there is a duty to bargain about 'other
types of management decisions' that may have an impact on terms
and conditions of employment." 4 He added that the Board's position
on plant relocation, subcontracting, automation, and consolidation
would be unaffected by the Supreme Court's opinion. 5
Despite these efforts to confine First National Maintenance to
partial shutdown decisions, some labor attorneys fear the opinion is
part of a trend to limit union bargaining rights to the effects of man-
agement decisions 'ather than to the decisions themselves even in the
area of automation and robotics.6
Automation Cases
Very few cases have addressed the issue of an employer's duty to
bargain over the introduction of automation. NLRB decisions on
automation have been inconsistent due to the changing makeup of
the Board.67 Decisions at the appellate level are factually complex
63. Id. at 686 n.22.
64. Office of the General Counsel, Memorandum 81-38 (July 27, 1981).
65. Id.
66. The Board recently considered a case in which an employer operating research
facilities in New Jersey and Connecticut decided to discontinue its activities in New
Jersey and to consolidate them with its operation in Connecticut. Otis Elevator Co., 269
N.L.R.B. No. 162 (1984). Relying on First National Maintenance, the Board found that
although the matter was of central concern to the union and to the employees it repre-
sented, the employer was not obligated to bargain over its decision. The Board indicated
that the critical factor in determining whether a decision is subject to mandatory bar-
gaining is "whether it turns upon a change in the nature or direction of the business, or
turns upon labor costs; not its effect on employees nor a union's ability to offer alterna-
tives." Id. at 6. Finally, in direct conflict with the majority opinion in First National
Maintenance, the Board indicated that all decisions which affect the scope, direction, or
nature of the employer's business are excluded from Section 8(d). Id. at 7.
Presumably, the Board would reject the balancing test developed by the Supreme
Court to deal with decisions which involve a change in the scope and direciton of the
business and also impact employment. See supra text accompanying notes 58-62. The
Board also disregards the plain and clear language of the National Labor Relations Act.
Section 8(d) explicitly includes as mandatory bargaining subjects "terms and conditions
of employment," suggesting that a major focus of inquiry in these cases should be the
effect of the decision upon employees.
67. Hanauer, supra note 10, at 54. The National Labor Relations Board is com-
prised of five members who are appointed by the President to serve staggered, five-year
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and ambiguous as to whether they require employers to decision bar-
gain or to bargain only over the effects of such decisions.68 The only
U.S. Supreme Court case even to mention bargaining over automa-
tion is First National Maintenance, and then only in a footnote.0 9
In one of its earliest automation cases, The Renton News Rec-
ord,70 the Board held that the employer had an obligation to bargain
over the introduction of automation. There the employer changed its
composing room from "hot" to "cold" type, 7  and discharged its
composing room employees. The Board stated that because automa-
tion is a matter of grave concern for the affected employees, it
should be faced jointly by labor and management. 2
Although the NLRB found the employer violated section 8(a)(5)
by refusing to bargain about both its decision to change its printing
process and the impact of the decision,7 3 it did not order the com-
pany to reinstate the terminated workers.7 4 Instead, the company
was required to bargain with the union only about the impact of its
accomplished decision on unit employees.
The NLRB has similarly treated subsequent automation cases,
finding a duty to decision bargain, but failing to order return to the
status quo ante.76 Although the Board, under section 10(c) of the
terms. Accordingly, the political fabric of the Board changes, with a certain amount of
"lag time," with each new administration. R. GORMAN, supra note 17, at 7.
68. See NLRB v. Columbia Tribune Publishing Co., 495 F.2d 1384, 86 L.R.R.M.
2078 (8th Cir. 1974). The employer violated sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) of the Act
when it changed its printing process from "hot" to "cold" type without bargaining with
the representative of the composing room employees. The union sought a guarantee that
the new cold type positions would be filled by employees in the old bargaining unit. The
main issue in the case was whether the union had jurisdiction over the new positions, for
it was debatable whether they were substantially equivalent to the old hot type positions.
The subject of decision bargaining was not really an issue, and the court's opinion is
unclear as to whether or not it requires employers to bargain over decisions to mecha-
nize. See also Metromedia, Inc. v. NLRB, 586 F.2d 1182, 99 L.R.R.M. 2743 (8th Cir.
1978) (The court found that the employer, the owner of a television station, violated
section 8(a)(5) by failing to bargain in good faith over the use of "minicams" it had
recently introduced. As in Columbia Tribune, the disagreement was not over the intro-
duction of technological innovation, but rather the awarding of the "newly-created" posi-
tions to another union. The decision was ambiguous as to whether it was addressing
decision or merely effects bargaining.)
69. 452 U.S. at 686 n.22.
70. 136 N.L.R.B. 1294, 49 L.R.R.M. 1972 (1962).
71. The "hot type" process is a complicated method of making press plates for
newspapers which requires the use of skilled employees. "Cold type" refers to a newer
and much different process which does not require any of the skilled labor necessary to
the hot type process. NLRB v. Columbia Tribune Publishing Co., 495 F.2d 1384, 86
L.R.R.M. 2078 (8th Cir. 1974).
72. 136 N.L.R.B. at 1297, 49 L.R.R.M. at 1973.
73. Id. at 1296, 49 L.R.R.M. at 1973.
74. Id. at 1298, 49 L.R.R.M. at 1974.
75. Id. at 1298, 49 L.R.R.M. at 1974.
76. See, e.g., Richland, Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. 91, 73 L.R.R.M. 1017 (1969).
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NLRA, 7 has the power to frame remedies for section 8(a)(5) viola-
tions, its remedies may not be punitive.7 8 Accordingly, the Board has
been reluctant to follow Fibreboard to the extent of ordering em-
ployers to stop using new equipment, reinstate terminated employees,
and to bargain over management decisions before "reintroducing"
automated equipment.79
In a recent automation case, Plymouth Locomotive Works, Inc.,80
the Board stated it had long held that:
where the automation of bargaining unit work will result in the elimination
of unit jobs, it is the duty of the employer to bargain with its employees'
bargaining representative over the decision to install automated equipment,
as well as the effects of such decision.81
The employer, Plymouth, eliminated the position of timekeeper after
determining that most of the timekeeper duties could be performed
by a computer."2 Plymouth violated section 8(a)(5) because it failed
to bargain with the union before eliminating the position.83 The em-
ployer was ordered to reinstate the displaced timekeeper to his for-
mer position or to a substantially equivalent position if the job of
timekeeper no longer existed."
Although the Board in Plymouth stated that an employer's deci-
sion to introduce labor saving equipment which results in the elimi-
nation of unit jobs was a mandatory subject of bargaining, 5 the cur-
rent Board seems to disagree.88 The current assumption is that
employers are only required to bargain over the impact of such deci-
sions.8 7 However, the Board (with its present membership) has yet to
decide an automation or robotics case.
77. 29 U.S.C. §160(c) (1976).
78. Id.
79. See Platt, supra note 18, at 151.
80. Plymouth Locomotive Works, Inc., 261 N.L.R.B. 595, 110 L.R.R.M. 1155
(1982).
81. Id. at 602.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 603.
84. Id. at 606.
85. Id. at 602.
86. David B. Parker, director of information of the NLRB, says, "We've been
working on the assumption that it's the employer who makes the decision about introduc-
ing new technology. But what impact it will have on the workplace or workers is the
subject of bargaining." Hanauer, supra note 10, at 28.
87. The last case dealing with decision bargaining over automation decided by the
NLRB was Plymouth Locomotive Works in May 1982. Three of the NLRB members
who decided that case are no longer on the Board.
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A DECISION TO AUTOMATE SHOULD BE A MANDATORY SUBJECT
OF BARGAINING
Legislative Intent
The language and legislative history of section 8(d) of the NLRA
suggest that all management decisions resulting in the termination of
unit work should be included in the scope of collective bargaining.
Although the original House bill specifically delimited the scope and
subject matter of mandatory bargaining,88 the Senate explicitly re-
jected the House proposal and substituted the present language:
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."89
The Senate's proposal was adopted in the congressional conference
report and the final legislationY0
Some commentators have argued that this revealed a congres-
sional intent to define broadly the mandatory subjects of bargaining,
and that this intent has been substantially altered by the judicial and
administrative interpretation of the Act.9 1 At any rate, the legislative
history of section 8(d) does not suggest that Congress intended to
exclude management decisions which eliminate bargaining unit work
from the duty to bargain.
Decisions to install robots fall within the language of section 8(d)
because such decisions drastically change the "terms and conditions"
of the jobs that are eliminated as a result. An employer who has a
duty to bargain over hours and wages should also be required to bar-
gain over changes which eradicate hours and wages.
Fibreboard Should Control in Automation and Robotics Cases
Fibreboard is controlling in the context of automation and robotics
because the situation in these cases parallels the situation in a sub-
contracting case. A decision to implement automation, like a deci-
sion to subcontract, will almost invariably have a detrimental effect
on the bargaining unit. Another similarity between the introduction
of robots and subcontracting is that the decision is usually motivated
by economics.
The custodial workforce in Fibreboard was replaced by another
88. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1947). In the original House
proposal, section 8(d) was limited to wages, hours, work requirements, discharges, sus-
pensions, layoffs, recalls, seniority, discipline, promotions, demotions, transfers, safety
and health, and vacations.
89. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1947). The Senate stated: "This
section attempts to limit narrowly the subject matters appropriate for collective bargain-
ing. It seems clear that the definitions are designed to exclude collective bargaining con-
cerning . . . a host of . . . matters traditionally the subject matter of collective
bargaining. .. ."
90. H.R. REP. No. 510, Conference Report, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1947).
91. See generally Gacek, supra note 15.
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workforce which could do the same work for less money.92 The loca-
tion, the type of work performed by the replacements, and the gen-
eral operation of the company remained the same.93 The difference
in an automation case is that the replacement is not human.
Under Fibreboard and subsequent Board subcontracting decisions
an employer should be required to bargain over a decision to intro-
duce robots where the decision will foreseeably and directly result in
an adverse impact on the bargaining unit or its members. Most deci-
sions to install robots (or other labor saving machinery) will result in
layoffs, which unquestionably have adverse effects on bargaining unit
members. Therefore, the result of treating alike a decision to use
robots to perform bargaining unit work and a decision to subcontract
unit work would be to make robot introduction decisions a
mandatory subject of bargaining in most instances.
Decisions to implement automation differ from subcontracting de-
cisions in one major respect. A decision to automate or introduce
robots normally requires substantial capital outlays and advanced
management planning.94 Although the Eighth and Ninth Circuits
have followed Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Fibreboard,
holding that management decisions requiring substantial capital ex-
penditure are not mandatory subjects of bargaining, the NLRB and
the other circuits have required bargaining over all management de-
cisions eliminating unit work.95
The latter approach is more sensible in light of past Board state-
ments that an employer's interest in managing its business should be
weighed against the legitimate interests of employees.96 Just as the
employer has invested capital in its business, the employees have in-
vested their labor.
9 7
Additionally, section 8(d) of the Act refers to "terms and condi-
tions of employment" as mandatory subjects of bargaining. The Act
does not distinguish between decisions which require substantial out-
lays of capital and those which do not. Also, management decisions
which result in the displacement or reclassification of employees cer-
tainly involve "terms and conditions of employment" as much as do
92. 379 U.S. 203, at 205-207.
93. Id. at 207.
94. "Even small robots take six months to plan." Steven Miller, assistant professor
of engineering and public policy at Carnegie-Mellon University's Robotics Institute,
quoted in Hanauer, supra note 10, at 31.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 46-54.
96. See Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561, 63 L.R.R.M. 1264 (1966).
97. Id. at 566, 63 L.R.R.M. at 1267.
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decisions about hours, wages, or work rules, all mandatory subjects
of bargaining.
Finally, some speculate that the balancing test announced in First
National Maintenance will be extended to all types of management
decisions "involving a change in the scope and direction of the busi-
ness enterprise." 98 This could result in unions being restricted to bar-
gaining only over the impact of automation decisions.9 9 This does not
seem to be a reasonable extension of First National Maintenance
because the Supreme Court expressly stated it "intimat[ed] no view
as to other types of management decisions."100 Also, the NLRB
General Counsel responded to First National Maintenance in a
memorandum providing that the opinion would not affect the
Board's positions on automation or subcontracting.10'
THE IMPORTANCE OF DECISION BARGAINING
Although employers must bargain collectively over the effects of
decisions resulting in the termination of unit work,0 2 whether they
must also afford unions the opportunity to bargain about the actual
decisions is unresolved. Some assert that the right to bargain over
impact adequately protects employee interests;103 however, practical
considerations of timing and union economic leverage suggest
otherwise.
A technical difference exists between a duty to decision bargain
and a duty to bargain over impact. Under the latter, the union is
restricted to discussing measures to cushion the effects of the deci-
sion. In contrast, where a duty to decision bargain exists, the union
can try to dissuade the employer from implementing its decision. In
a situation where a decision to install robots is pending, the union
may attempt to offer evidence that the employer has made miscalcu-
lations, or that at present, automation would not be economically
sound. The union could try to convince the employer either to post-
pone its decision or to replace workers only by attrition. Further-
more, allowing the union to participate in the decision-making pro-
cess affords the union an opportunity to make concessions which the
employer may not have previously contemplated.
A more important distinction between decision and impact bar-
gaining concerns timing. It is essential that the union have the right
to bargain prior to implementation of the employer's decision,
98. First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 677 (1981).
99. See Hanauer, supra note 10, at 29.
100. 452 U.S. at 686 n.22.
101. Office of the General Counsel, Memorandum 81-38 (July 27, 1981).
102. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
103. Hanauer, supra note 10, at 30. See also Note, Automation and Collective
Bargaining, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1822, 1850 (1971).
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largely because the union's influence in decision-making is ultimately
dependent on its ability to exert economic force. If the union is con-
fined to bargaining after implementation, the bargaining unit is
robbed of its economic leverage. Once the workers have been re-
placed by robots, the potential impact of a strike is greatly
diminished.
A fear exists that if unions are confined to bargaining over the
effects of management decisions, an employer will be able to imple-
ment its decision before bargaining with the union.104 Theoretically,
if an employer is not required to bargain over a decision to introduce
robots, it is free to install the robots before bargaining with the
union. Conversely, if a decision to introduce robots is a mandatory
subject of bargaining, the employer may implement its decision only
at impasse.10 5
It has been suggested that because some members of the bargain-
ing unit usually will remain after the robots are installed,10 6 the
union often will retain some economic leverage after implementation.
Once an employer has installed robots, however, it is unlikely that
any amount of pressure from the union will be able to force the em-
ployer to remove them.
CONCLUSION
Whether employers must bargain collectively over the installation
of robots remains unresolved by the Board and the courts. When
faced with a robotics case, the NLRB should follow Fibreboard and
its progeny by deciding that robot introduction decisions having a
"demonstrable adverse impact" on the bargaining unit or its mem-
bers fall within the mandatory subjects of bargaining. This would, at
the very least, necessitate bargaining where workers are expected to
be terminated or transferred to lower paying positions.
Although most discussion at the bargaining table probably would
concern the impact of automation on the workforce, unions must be
given the right to participate in the actual decision. This would pre-
vent an employer from waiting until it has accomplished its decision
before notifying and bargaining with the union. Unless a union is
104. Hanauer, supra note 10, at 29.
105. If an employer bargains in good faith to impasse over a decision to automate,
he is then free to implement the decision. However, the employer's freedom to act unilat-
erally at impasse is limited to his pre-impasse bargaining proposals. NLRB v. Katz, 369
U.S. 736, 745 (1962).
106. Note, supra note 103, at 1850 n.126.
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able to bargain prior to implementation, it will be denied a meaning-
ful opportunity to represent its members' interest in the face of tech-
nological displacement.
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